MARITIME NEWS

ABS Releases Chemical Tanker e-Learning Package                                                    



ABS, a provider of maritime classification services, launched Chem-eL, a specialized training package designed to support safety and competence in chemical tanker operations. Chem-eL is a sector-specific e-learning marine product developed in accordance with the requirements stated in the International Maritime Organization's International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers and the relevant IMO Model Course.

Developed by ABS in cooperation with Malaysian Maritime Academy (ALAM), a subsidiary of the MISC Bhd. (MISC), Chem-eL is designed to enable shipowners in this highly specialized sector to optimize their training programs for shipboard and shore-based staff.

"MISC identified a need for an e-learning program that could be used within the MISC and Group company fleet, as well as for students at its own training facilities. Drawing on technical knowledge from within ABS, we were able to develop a curriculum that could additionally serve the wider industry," said ABS Chief Learning Officer Mark McGrath.

The package was made available to MISC headquarters in October 2012 for use across the fleet and at its maritime training institution, ALAM, to enable eight months' shipboard and shore-based testing.

David Fredrick, Malaysian Maritime Academy Chief Executive Officer, noted that, "Ensuring the required level of safety in chemical tanker operations requires a very high standard of training to support crew competence. When MISC wanted to develop a training package for use at ALAM and across the company, we knew that ABS had the technical and education expertise to support our aims and deliver a package that fulfilled our needs."

Chem-eL supports safe and compliant shipboard operations by making the necessary training resources available in a highly flexible way. Accessible online, it requires no specialized software installation. Responsive customer support, user-friendly interface and high quality graphics all enhance the learning experience.

Course topics include an introduction to chemical tank practice, chemical and physical cargo properties, hazards and hazard control design, cargo containment and handling systems, safe working practices, pollution prevention and ballast operations. Also covered are tank cleaning operations, risk management, the ship/shore interface, emergency, security and custody transfer aspects relating to carriage of liquid chemicals in bulk.

Capt. Loo Eng Chuan, MISC Senior Manager, Operations, Chemical Business Unit, said, "Chem-eL is the first program that provides step-by-step guidance to learners from basic understanding to advanced stages of chemical tanker operations and it also covers commercial aspects of chemical business."

MARITIME NEWS

ClassNK Update on Loss of 'MOL Comfort'                                                             Based on both the results of its own independent investigation as well as the deliberations of the third meeting of the Committee on Large Container Ship Safety held on 28 October 2013, the ClassNK Casualty Investigation Team has released preliminary findings and safety measures resulting from the investigation into the causes of the sinking of the container ship 'MOL Comfort' as follows: Preliminary Findings Based on the presence of water-ingress in the bottom of the vessel’s midship at the outset of the casualty, the fracture in the vessel’s hull is considered to have originated from the bottom part of the vessel. Hull strength and loads at the time of accident were assessed in order to investigate how the fracture occurred and progressed. Structural hull capacity was analyzed using non-linear finite element 3-hold modeling, and dynamic wave loads including whipping effects were also analyzed. Weather, sea state and cargo loading condition data from the vessel’s previous voyages are being investigated to estimate the loads acting on the vessel. In addition, structural inspections were conducted on the sister vessels of the MOL Comfort. During the inspections of the sister vessels, buckling type deformations measuring approximately 20mm in height were observed on the bottom shell plates in the vicinity of center line of midship area. However, it remains unclear at this stage as to whether this type of deformation could have served as a trigger for the casualty. Reinforcement work to increase the hull strength of the sister vessels is already being carried out as a preventative safety measure. With cooperation from shipowners, structural investigations are also being carried out to determine whether similar deformations have occurred in large container vessels with designs differing from those of the MOL Comfort. Numerical analyses of hull strength and applied loads continue to be conducted in order to develop a more detailed understanding of the casualty and establish countermeasures to prevent the occurrence of similar casualties in the future. Safety Measures Based on the preliminary findings noted above, the ClassNK Casualty Investigation Team has proposed the following safety measures be carried out on large container ships in order to prevent the occurrence of similar casualties. It is recommended that crew inspect the midship section to the extent possible in order to determine whether deformations have occurred on the bottom shell plates. At the request of shipowners, ClassNK will dispatch qualified surveyors to attend such inspections free of charge. If consecutive deformations in the transverse direction are observed on the bottom shell plates an occasional survey is recommended. ClassNK will dispatch qualified surveyors upon request. The ClassNK Casualty Investigation Team will continue to work closely with the Committee on Large Container Ship Safety as it continues to investigate the MOL Comfort casualty and compile its final report on the incident.

 

MARITIME NEWS

Retrofit Solutions for Exhaust Gas and Water Cleaning                                              


Upcoming environmental regulations will affect existing vessels, and as a consequence there is a growing demand for exhaust gas cleaning and ballast water treatment systems.

Retrofitting both scrubbers and ballast water management systems is – or will soon be – required for many ships to comply with regulations. There are retrofit solutions available across all ship types, from cruise vessels to merchant and offshore ships. Space requirement is usually the most critical factor when planning and executing a retrofit project but Wärtsilä has found solutions to the challenge.

The execution of retrofit projects for both scrubbers and ballast water management systems requires similar types of planning and engineering. There are typically three things that are analysed when planning a retrofit of exhaust gas or a water cleaning system. First, the space requirements of the system are analysed, taking into consideration the available space in the vessel. Next, engineers study the impact of the additional systems in terms of their weight, ship stability in case of scrubber systems, structural modifications, and relocation of any existing equipment inside the ship. Finally, engineers assess how to further optimise the installation method, with the aim of minimising costs and downtime during installation.

“Retrofitting exhaust gas or ballast water cleaning systems is feasible for all ship types – but how it is done can vary depending on the ship type. Finding space for the system is the most common challenge. When it comes to scrubber installations, we, for example, sometimes need to make changes in the funnel shape or rethink the use of spaces in the vessel to create more room for cleaning systems. However, we have not come across any project in which retrofitting would not be possible. It is just a matter of identifying the best solution or compromise with the ship owner,” says Leonardo Sonzio, Director Retrofit, Wärtsilä Environmental Solutions.

According to Sonzio, the biggest cost factors in retrofits are the equipment, and the installation operations and material. Generally, the cost of the equipment varies depending on the type and size of the ship. The installation cost depends on the extent of modifications to the existing ship, and the time needed at the dry dock.  As a rule of thumb, equipment and installation each represent forty percent of the total price for a turnkey retrofit; the remaining twenty percent is related to engineering, project management, site management, logistics and class approval costs.

“We have delivered or are in the process of delivering dozens of new build and retrofit projects for scrubbers. These include tankers, bulk carriers, container vessels, ro-ros, cruise vessels and ferries. More and more inquiries are coming in from ship owners. Also, we are expecting the demand for ballast water management systems to grow steadily, and we have experience with both new build and retrofit cases. Our approach to a successful retrofit project is true partnership and thorough engineering and planning before the contract is even signed. This enables us to manage risks in close cooperation with our customer,” Sonzio explains.

Wärtsilä ballast water management systems use a two stage approach involving mechanical filtration of organisms followed by a choice of either UV treatment  or electro-chlorination. The Wärtsilä portfolio of scrubbers includes three configurations: seawater open loop scrubbers, closed loop scrubbers, and hybrid scrubbers. All three configurations include a wash water treatment plant to clean the effluents before discharge into the sea with no risk of harm to the environment.

Wärtsilä said it is the only company capable of providing both scrubber and ballast water systems combined with turnkey retrofit services. With its professional project organization, Wärtsilä is able to manage all kinds of retrofit projects worldwide. Wärtsilä’s global services network supports customers throughout the lifecycle of the ship.

The most evident approaching regulations for existing vessels are the IMO Marpol Annex VI focusing on sulphur oxide (SOx) emissions, and the IMO Global Ballast Water Convention.

MARITIME NEWS

 Maersk tankers 

South Korean shipbuilder Sungdong is rumoured to have won a prestigious 10-vessel new building order from Danish shipping giant Maersk. Marine industry sources are claiming that an order for four 50,000DWT product tankers and two 115,000DWT LR2 tankers were placed at the shipbuilder for delivery in 2015 and 2016. If true, the orders are potentially worth over a hundred million apiece, along with options for two additional vessels for each order. However, the contract has yet to be finalised, with an official from Maersk Tankers stating that the company is considering new building orders for maintaining the reasonable average age of its product carrier fleet.

LATEST MARITIME NEWS

Seafarers’ union, Nautilus International, has expressed concern about the seizure of a master and chief engineer officer from an offshore support vessel operating in the Gulf of Guinea.

The two men – both reported to be US citizens – were taken from the US-owned platform supply vessel C-Retriever in the early hours of Wednesday morning. The US-flagged vessel, owned by Edison Chouest, was working off Brass, Nigeria.
Nautilus general secretary, Mark Dickinson, said the incident highlighted the urgent need for action to prevent West African piracy from deteriorating further. While piracy off Somalia has declined significantly over the past year, new figures from the International Maritime Bureau reveal that there were more than 40 attacks officially recorded in the Gulf of Guinea during the first nine months of this year, with 132 crew taken hostage and seven vessels hijacked.
“There are good grounds for believing that the real total of attacks is much higher, as the under-reporting and non-reporting in the region is notorious,” Mr Dickinson said.
“This latest case underlines the pressing need for action to improve security in the area before it becomes a no-go zone,” he added. “The problem is acute, complex and reaches beyond the seafarers and shipowners. European maritime unions and shipowners recently set out ways in which the toolbox developed to deal with piracy off Somalia could be adapted for West Africa, and it is high time we saw some meaningful response to this. Governments must not wait until we have significant loss of life or an environmental disaster before they give seafarers the protection they deserve.”

MARPOL

Torrey Canyon 1967

•1959 US built, 60,000 dwt, , Li. flagged

•Jumboised to 120,000 dwt

•Cargo 120,000 ts of BP oil for Milford Haven

•Navigational error caused grounding ripping open 6 tanks

•31,000,000 gallons of oil leaked

•Oil spread along the sea between England and France

Amoco Cadiz 1978

•1974 built Amoco Cadiz carrying 227,000 tonnes of crude oil

•ran aground off the coast of Brittany, France at 10:00 p.m. on March 16, 1978

•The whole cargo spilled out as the breakers spilt the vessel in two, progressively polluting 360 km of shoreline

•At the time this was the largest oil spill by tanker ever registered.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)

•as amended by the 1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78)

Just Oil…

•1954 OILPOL Convention

–Operational

•Discharge zones (50nm and 100ppm)

•Reception facilities

Not just Oil…

MARPOL Annexes I – VI

•

•

I.Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil

II.Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk

III.Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form

IV.Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships

V.Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships

VI.Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships

MARPOL Implementation

•

•1967 Torrey Canyon

•1973-1978 Amoco Cadiz et al.

•MARPOL ’73 and the Protocol ‘78

•MARPOL enters into force October 1983

–Annex I and II - 1983

–Annex III – 1992

–Annex V – 1988

–Annex IV – 2003

–Annex VI - 2005

WHY ENGINE DOES NOT START

The engine does not start
You have lined up the valves and opened the indicator cocks as you want to do an air blow through. It is to check if any incompressible fluid has leaked into the combustion spaces. You press the starting air button and hear the sound of air escaping but the tachometer does not move. Suspecting that the tachometer wire as broken, you check the flywheel only to find it is not rotating either. What could go wrong? The following are a list of suspected reasons for the fault:

1. The air receiver pressure is low. Please check the pressure of the air receiver and start the compressors.
2. In case the air receiver pressure is satisfactory, check the starting air valve on the air bottle and the valves in the line.
3. Check for any leakage in the starting air piping.
4. The individual air starting valves on the cylinder heads might be stuck or sticky.
5. The air distributor might be faulty and not allowing air into the cylinders. Try rotating the engine with the turning gear and restart.

 The engine turns on air but does not run on fuel

In this case the engine is turning on air, but does not pick up on fuel. You try giving a longer kick and put the fuel lever at a higher notch, but still the generator stops. The starting air pressure is now low and the air low pressure alarm is sounding. All the compressors have started automatically and are running continuously. You are waiting for the pressure to build up and try yet again. Well if such is the case you need to stop and investigate the reasons for the failure to start. They could be one of the following:
1. Fuel does not reach the fuel injection pump because there is air in the system.
2. The fuel oil filters are choked.
3. The fuel line valve is not open.
4. The trips have been not reset after the last stopping.
5. Fuel oil service tank is at low level. Beware the other generator is also going to stop.
6. There is water in the line.
7. The fuel valves are faulty and not giving proper atomization or are choked.
8. The fuel pump timing is wrong.
9. Leaking fuel injection pipes.
10. Seized plungers of the fuel pumps.
11. Fuel rack linkage stuck in position.
12. Seized delivery valves or broken plunger springs in injection pump.
13. The engine is cold